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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario not too far off in the future where drones in the
sky are a regular occurrence over densely populated urban areas.
These drones do not need to be in the line of sight of an operator and
do not need to be actively operated at all as they fly around
autonomously. Some of the drones you can see but more are present
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then the eye can discern. Some are flying too high to see and are too
quiet to hear.
The drones constantly flying overhead are delivering packages,
transporting people, monitoring traffic, checking infrastructure,
providing building security, and monitoring the environment. You
know that the drones carry all sorts of high-tech equipment. But you
do not know exactly what technology is on the drone, what the
surveillance capabilities are, what information these drones could be
collecting about you and anyone else who happens to be in a public
space, or how this information could be used or to whom the
information could be disclosed. Going into public essentially means
giving up your privacy in a way never imagined before with little to no
say in the matter. To maintain any semblance of privacy in public
requires extraordinary efforts that limit your ability to participate in
modern society. You do not carry your smartphone or any other
mobile device that connects to the internet,1 you wear a hood and
special tinted glasses to thwart ear,2 iris,3 and facial recognition,4 and
you randomize your gait.5 You also wear gloves to prevent the
capture of your fingerprints,6 avoid driving your own car,7 and avoid

1. Mobile devices periodically emit a wireless signal, referred to as a probe, to
find wireless networks to connect to and these probes includes a unique number
called a media access control (“MAC”) address, which can be used to track your
movements. Latanya Sweeney, My Phone at Your Service, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Feb. 12, 2014, 4:15 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/techftc/2014/02/myphone-your-service [https://perma.cc/D5AK-H9SP].
2. Your ear may someday unlock your phone just like your finger. See Teo
Armus, Use Your Ear to Unlock Your Phone, PSFK (June 30, 2015),
https://www.psfk.com/2015/06/amazon-fire-ear-recognition-technology-amazonpatent.html [https://perma.cc/XH5X-E2HV].
3. The distance at which iris recognition can be performed is increasing. See
Robinson Meyer, Long-Range Iris Scanning Is Here, ATLANTIC (May 13, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/05/long-range-iris-scanning-ishere/393065/ [https://perma.cc/CGK3-MJ6R].
4. Facial recognition thwarting glasses are already a thing. Alex Perala, New
Glasses Can Thwart Facial Recognition, FIND BIOMETRICS (Aug. 10, 2015),
http://findbiometrics.com/glasses-thwart-facial-recognition-8104/
[https://perma.cc/6VGA-WX9L].
5. Gait analysis is now used more frequently to identify individuals. See Jim
Giles, Cameras Know You by Your Walk, NEW SCIENTIST (Sept. 19, 2012),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21528835-600-cameras-know-you-by-yourwalk/ [https://perma.cc/U3HX-8LQG].
6. A digital fingerprint can now be lifted from a sufficiently high-resolution
photo. See Andy Boxall, Careful, Your Fun Peace Sign Selfie May Lead to Identity
Theft, DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 11, 2017, 3:58 AM), http://www.digital
trends.com/mobile/peace-sign-selfie-fingerprint-identity-theft-news/
[https://perma.cc/M9Q9-K93L]; see also Alex Hern, Hacker Fakes German Minister’s
Fingerprints Using Photos of Her Hands, GUARDIAN (last updated Feb. 21, 2017),
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using the new self-driving/flying drone cars8—you stick to walking,
biking, or mass public transportation.
The description above sounds a lot like the beginning of a
dystopian novel, but it is the current track we are on as drones are
being integrated into the National Airspace with no privacy
protections for public space.
In 2012, the Federal Aviation
Administration (“FAA”) was tasked by Congress with integrating
drones into the National Airspace. Five years later, the agency is still
working on domestic drone integration but refuses to address privacy
as the agency works to establish safety rules for drones despite
identifying privacy as an important issue to address as drones are
integrated into the National Airspace.9
Part I of this Article discusses the FAA Modernization and Reform
Act of 2012. The subsections of this Part will discuss some of the
relevant details of the Act, the petition of the FAA to address drone
privacy after the Act was passed, and the FAA’s changing
relationship with privacy. Part II highlights the privacy issues created
by the integration of drones. Part III will look at the lack of legal
protections for privacy in public, and Part IV will provide an example
of how these lack of protections provide incentives for companies to
amass data on individuals in public for financial gain. Part V will
discuss why privacy in public is so important, and Part VI will provide
reasons why the FAA needs to address privacy as the agency
integrates drones. Finally, the Article provides some concluding
thoughts, including the most important action the FAA could force
drone companies to do.
I. FAA MODERNIZATION ACT
On February 14, 2012, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012 (“FAA Modernization Act” or “the Act”) was enacted,
requiring the Federal Aviation Administration to establish drone
regulations and implement drones into the National Airspace System
(“National Airspace”).10
The Act established a number of

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/30/hacker-fakes-germanministers-fingerprints-using-photos-of-her-hands [https://perma.cc/7UHP-J9D2].
7. See Kaveh Waddell, Amazon Wants to Scan Your License Plate, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/amazonwants-to-scan-your-license-plate/503747/ [https://perma.cc/KV6L-6BY7].
8. See generally Pop.Up: Urban Transport Reimagined, AIRBUS, http://airbusxo.com/pop-up-urban-transport-reimagined/ [https://perma.cc/5M5W-R3NU].
9. See infra Part I.
10. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. (2012)).
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requirements and deadlines for the FAA to meet. Section 332 of the
Act requires the FAA to develop a “Comprehensive Plan” to
integrate drones into the National Airspace.11 The Comprehensive
Plan was to be finished no later than 270 days after the FAA
Modernization Act became law.12
Congress set minimum
requirements for the plan, including projections on the required
public drone rulemaking with specific recommendations on “how the
rulemaking will—”
(i) define the acceptable standards for operation and certification of
civil unmanned aircraft systems; (ii) ensure that any civil unmanned
aircraft system includes a sense and avoid capability; and (iii)
establish standards and requirements for the operator and pilot of a
civil unmanned aircraft system, including standards and
requirements for registration and licensing . . .13

The Comprehensive Plan was due to Congress within one year of
the FAA Modernization Act becoming law.14 At the same time
Congress required the submission of the Comprehensive Plan, it also
required the FAA to develop a five-year roadmap (“the Roadmap”)
for the introduction of drones into the National Airspace.15
The Act requires the FAA to implement the recommendations of
the Comprehensive Plan through a public notice-and-comment
rulemaking.16 The notice for the Comprehensive Plan rulemaking
was due within eighteen months after the Comprehensive Plan was
due to Congress.17 The final rule was then to be published within
sixteen months after the notice of the Comprehensive Plan
rulemaking.18 Using all the deadlines set by Congress and adding up
the months, the final rule was to be published within forty-six months
of the enactment of the FAA Modernization Act, which would have
been in December 2015.19
The FAA has completely failed to adhere to the timeline
established by Congress. As of April 2017, over sixty months had
passed since the enactment of the FAA Modernization Act, and not
even the notice for the rulemaking to implement the Comprehensive

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. § 332(a)(1).
Id.
Id. § 332(a)(2).
Id. § 332(a)(4).
Id. §§ 332(a)(4), 332(a)(5).
Id. § 332(b).
Id.
Id. § 332(b)(2).
See id. §§ 332(a)(4), 332(b).
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Plan has been published. The Comprehensive Plan itself has been
published but even that was delivered to Congress nearly nine months
later than required.20
A. The FAA and the Petition for a Drone Privacy Rulemaking
Although the FAA has not yet conducted the rulemaking to
implement the Comprehensive Plan as required by Congress, the
agency has conducted one rulemaking on drone integration related to
small commercial drones.21 That small drone rulemaking seemingly
highlighted a reversal by the agency to address privacy in a formal
way as it worked to integrate drones into the National Airspace.22
The notice for the rulemaking stated that privacy was “beyond the
scope of this rulemaking” and concluded that the agency had no
jurisdiction to regulate drone privacy.23
This statement and conclusion in the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (“NPRM”) for the small drone rulemaking seemingly
went against the FAA’s previous actions and words, as well as
congressional intent. To understand why, this Article looks at the
agency’s history with privacy as it relates to drones.
As previously mentioned, the FAA Modernization Act became law
in February 2012. Immediately after the enactment of the Act, the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”)24 led a coalition of
organizations, legal scholars, and technology experts to petition the
FAA to establish drone privacy rules—noting that “[t]he increased
use of drones poses an ongoing threat to every person residing within

20. See Letter from Anthony R. Foxx, U.S. Sec’y of Transp., to Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman, Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., U.S. Senate, et al. (Nov.
6, 2013).
21. See Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80
Fed. Reg. 9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, et
al.); FAA Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed.
Reg. 42,064 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, et al.).
22. As explained later in this section, the FAA had indicated in its response to a
drone privacy petition brought by EPIC that the agency would consider privacy in
the small drone rulemaking but when the notice came out for the rulemaking, the
FAA stated privacy was outside the scope.
23. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed.
Reg. at 9544, 9552.
24. The petition to the FAA was led by the Electronic Privacy Information
Center (“EPIC”), a public interest research center based in Washington, DC that
focuses public attention on emerging privacy and civil liberty issues. See EPIC,
https://epic.org, https://perma.cc/L2S3-N4C8.
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the United States.”25 Specifically, the petition called upon the FAA
to conduct a separate rulemaking on the privacy issues raised by
drones in the National Airspace.26
Nearly two and a half years after the EPIC-led coalition petitioned
the FAA to conduct a drone privacy rulemaking, the agency
responded.27 In the FAA’s response, the agency stated that “[a]fter
reviewing [EPIC’s petition], we have determined that the issue you
have raised is not an immediate safety concern.”28 But, the agency
also explained that “the FAA has begun a rulemaking addressing civil
operation of small unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace
system. We will consider your comments and arguments as part of
that project.”29 During that very project however, the FAA abruptly
reversed the agency’s prior response to the EPIC-led coalition
petition for drone privacy rules, stating in the notice-of-proposed
rulemaking for small drones that privacy was “beyond the scope of
this rulemaking.”30 This decision was made all the more befuddling
given the agency’s prior work up to this point, including soliciting
public comments on a privacy policy for the drone test sites required
by the FAA Modernization Act.31
B.

The FAA, Drones, and Privacy

After the FAA Modernization Act was passed in 2012, the FAA
appeared to embrace privacy as the agency went through the process
of integrating drones into the National Airspace. Within two months
of the Act becoming law, Senator Edward J. Markey (D-MA) and
Representative Joe Barton (R-TX) sent a letter to the FAA with
several questions focused on privacy and the integration of drones

25. Letter from EPIC et al., to Michael P. Huerta, Fed. Aviation Acting Admin.
(Feb. 24, 2012), https://epic.org/apa/lawsuit/EPIC-FAA-Drone-Petition-March-82012.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWZ7-2QNH].
26. Id. at 5.
27. Letter from Lirio Liu, Dir., Off. of Rulemaking, Fed. Aviation Admin., to
Marc Rotenberg, Exec. Dir., EPIC (Nov. 26, 2014), https://epic.org/privacy/
drones/FAA-Privacy-Rulemaking-Letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A368-ETN7]
[hereinafter Liu Letter].
28. Id. at 1.
29. Id.
30. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed.
Reg. 9544, 9552 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015).
31. Unmanned Aircraft System Test Sites, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,259 (proposed Feb. 22,
2013).
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into the National Airspace.32 The legislators noted that although
drones will have their benefits, they also “enable invasive and
pervasive surveillance without adequate privacy protections.”33 The
legislators wanted to know “how the FAA is addressing” the privacy
implications of drones.34 Markey and Barton noted that the
rulemaking process required by the FAA Modernization Act
afforded the agency the “opportunity and responsibility to ensure that
privacy of individuals is protected and that the public is fully informed
about who is using drones in the public airspace and why.”35
In response to the letter, the FAA acknowledged the privacy risks
associated with drones, stating, “[t]he FAA recognizes that there are
privacy concerns related to UAS operations, and the agency will
review these concerns in the context of the ongoing UAS rulemaking
activities and integration plans.”36
Indeed, one of the early
requirements of the FAA Modernization Act was the establishment
of drone test sites, and the FAA not only proposed privacy provisions
for the test sites, but also solicited feedback from the public on the
provisions.37
The FAA’s acknowledgement of the privacy risks raised by drones
did not end with the agency’s response to a letter from congressional
members asking about drones and privacy, or soliciting comments on
a privacy policy for drone test sites. The core documents required by
the FAA Modernization Act, the Roadmap and the Comprehensive
Plan, to guide the integration of drones into the National Airspace
were very explicit about privacy being an important issue to address
with drone integration.38

32. Letter from S. Markey & Rep. Barton, to Michael P. Huerta, Fed. Aviation
Acting Admin. (Apr. 19, 2012), https://fas.org/irp/congress/2012_cr/drones041912.pdf
[https://perma.cc/97AN-UFCQ].
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Letter from Fed. Aviation Acting Admin., Michael P. Huerta, to S. Markey
(Sept. 21, 2012).
37. Unmanned Aircraft System Test Sites, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,259 (proposed Feb. 22,
2013); see also Letter from Kathryn B. Thomson, Fed. Aviation Admin. Chief
Counsel, to Marc Rotenberg, President, EPIC (Feb. 14, 2013).
38. See generally FED. AVIATION ADMIN., INTEGRATION OF CIVIL UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (NAS) ROADMAP
(2013), https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/UAS_Roadmap_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PT2R-XUSU] [hereinafter ROADMAP]; JOINT PLAN. & DEV. OFF., UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) COMPREHENSIVE PLAN (Sept. 2013), https://www.faa.gov/
about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agi/reports/media/UAS_Comprehensive_Plan.
pdf [https://perma.cc/MP92-WTEZ] [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE PLAN].
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The FAA Modernization Act required the creation of “a 5-year
Roadmap for the introduction of civil unmanned aircraft systems into
the national airspace system.”39 The Roadmap includes a section
entitled “Privacy and Civil Liberties Considerations.”40 In this
section, the FAA recognizes that the potential increase in drones in
the National Airspace “raises questions as to how to accomplish UAS
integration in a manner that is consistent with privacy and civil
liberties considerations.”41 The Roadmap does state that the “FAA’s
mission does not include developing or enforcing policies pertaining
to privacy or civil liberties.”42 However, this statement does not
preclude the agency from addressing privacy, and Congress also gave
the FAA wide latitude and a mandate to address the issues associated
with integrating drones and only insisted on minimum requirements
for the scope of the Comprehensive Plan.43
The Act required a comprehensive plan that would make
recommendations as to what issues needed to be addressed as part of
integrating drones into the National Airspace, and was explicit that
the recommendations of the Comprehensive Plan be implemented
through public rulemaking.44 The FAA’s Comprehensive Plan was
equally explicit in the need to address privacy, stating that
“[m]embers of the NextGen SPC agree on the need to address
privacy concerns of the public at large while safely integrating UAS in
the NAS.”45 The Next Generation Air Transportation Senior Policy
Committee (“Nextgen SPC”) is chaired by the Secretary of
Transportation and includes as it members the following individuals
or their designee: the Administrator of the FAA, the Administrator
of NASA, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of the Office
of Science and Technology Policy.46 Despite the many statements by
the FAA regarding the importance of addressing the privacy
implications of drones, when it came time to actually address privacy
in the small drone rulemaking, the FAA shied away from the subject.

39. Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 § 332(b)(5) (2012).
40. ROADMAP, supra note 38.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 § 332(a)(1).
44. Id. at §§ 332(a)-(b).
45. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 38, at 7.
46. The Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108176, § 710(b), 117 Stat. 2490, 2584 (2003).
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EPIC v. FAA

Although not the focus of this Article, to give a more complete
view of the FAA and drone privacy, it is worth briefly describing the
challenges brought by EPIC—a public interest organization focused
on emerging privacy issues—against the FAA for the agency’s failure
to address the privacy risks raised by drones.
When the FAA denied EPIC’s petition for a separate public
rulemaking on drone privacy issues, the agency pointed to the
upcoming small drone rulemaking as the appropriate opportunity for
EPIC, other organizations, and the public to comment on concerns
with privacy.47 As discussed earlier, when it came time for the FAA
to issue the notice-of-proposed rulemaking, the agency reversed
course and stated that privacy was outside the scope of the
rulemaking.48
In response to the reversal by the FAA to consider privacy in the
small drone rulemaking, EPIC filed a petition for review with the
D.C. Circuit. EPIC brought two challenges: 1) for the agency’s
denial of EPIC’s petition; and 2) for the agency’s failure to consider
privacy in the context of the small drone rulemaking.49 The D.C.
Circuit ruled that with respect to the first challenge, EPIC was timebarred.50 Concerning the second challenge, the Court ruled that the
challenge was premature because the small drone rulemaking was not
a final reviewable order.51 The final rule for the small drone
rulemaking was published in June 2016 and since then EPIC has filed
another petition for review in the D.C. Circuit, which includes a
challenge to the final rule.52 As of April 2017, the case is still pending
before the D.C. Circuit. As the integration of drones continues and
drone technology rapidly advances, whether the FAA is forced to
47. Liu Letter, supra note 27.
48. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed.
Reg. 9544, 9552 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015).
49. EPIC v. FAA, 821 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
50. Id. at 41. EPIC was time-barred because the organization did not file a
petition to review within the sixty days required by the Administrative Procedure
Act. Additionally, the Court did not agree with EPIC that FAA’s response was an
ambiguous denial at best given the fact the agency stated it would consider privacy in
an upcoming rulemaking.
51. Id. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, only a final action can typically
be challenged and a notice of a proposed rule is not typically considered a final action
and was not in this case despite the arguments of EPIC that the notice represented
the final response (i.e. the denial) to EPIC’s petition when the agency stated in the
notice that privacy was outside the scope of the rulemaking.
52. Petition for Review, EPIC v. FAA, 821 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 161297).
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address privacy concerns may have long-lasting implications for our
privacy in public space.
II. PRIVACY ISSUES
Drones can carry sophisticated surveillance equipment, and “by
virtue of their design, their size, and how [high] they can fly, [drones]
can operate undetected in urban and rural environments.”53 The
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (“DARPA”) created
the Autonomous Real-time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance-Infrared
(“ARGUS-IR”) system, which enables “a persistent, real-time, highresolution, wide-area, day-night video survelliance capability”54 The
field of view is roughly sixty-five square miles and ARGUS-IR can
track sixty-five objects within that field of view at the same time.55
The U.S. Army mounted the ARGUS-IR on a drone capable of
hovering for over twenty hours at an altitude in excess of 15,000
feet.56 Drones in general are a flexible platform for various
surveillance technologies and can be equipped with long-range zoom
lenses, thermal imaging, night vision, radar, facial recognition and
other biometric recognition capabilities, automated-license plate
readers, and other sensors to gather personal information.57
What does all the technology available to drones mean for privacy?
Simply put, it means drones pose a unique threat to privacy in public.
Drones greatly increase the capacity for domestic surveillance
because drones provide a cheap aerial surveillance platform to which
numerous surveillance technologies can be attached. Although aerial

53. Jennifer Lynch, Are Drones Watching You, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 10,
2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/drones-are-watching-you
[https://perma.cc/F6CB-7BM8].
54. DARPA, DEP’T OF DEF. FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2014 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET
SUBMISSION, Exhibit R-2A, 13 (2013), http://www.darpa.mil/attachments/(2G3)
%20Global%20Nav%20-%20About%20Us%20-%20Budget%20-%20Budget%20
Entries%20-%20FY2014%20(Approved).pdf [https://perma.cc/3D2F-BYBH].
55. US Army Unveils 1.8 Gigapixel Camera Helicopter Drone, BBC NEWS (Mar.
8, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-16358851 [https://perma.cc/4B7DAVCE].
56. See David Hambling, Special Forces’ Gigapixel Flying Spy Eyes All, WIRED
(Feb. 12, 2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/02/gigapixel-flyin/ [https://perma.cc/
ML9R-LKL5].
57. Ciara Bracken-Roche et al., Surveillance Drones: Privacy Implications of the
Spread of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in Canada, SURVEILLANCE STUD.
CTR. 18-19 (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.sscqueens.org/sites/default/files/Surveillance_
Drones_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QBC-3UVQ].
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surveillance has been possible for some time, drones will alter both
the economics and industry of aerial surveillance.58
Before drones, conducting aerial surveillance required the use of a
helicopter or airplane. The expense of using either created three
restrictions: 1) who could use airplanes or helicopters for aerial
surveillance; 2) how often an airplane or helicopter could be used for
aerial surveillance; and 3) for what purpose aerial surveillance would
be used.59 The economic limitations meant very few people had
access to aerial surveillance, aerial surveillance was not used
frequently, and the purposes for which aerial surveillance were used
were narrow because the surveillance had to be worth the expense.60
Under these circumstances, mass aerial surveillance was not practical.
Drones, however, have changed the economics of aerial
surveillance, making it accessible to practically anyone. This change
in economics also expanded the industry for aerial surveillance.61
Drones are being built specifically for aerial surveillance to conduct
environmental monitoring, infrastructure inspection, and agricultural
workflow among many other applications.62 The increased industry
around drones means drone technology advances at an accelerated
rate. Drones will eventually fly autonomously and carry increasingly
sophisticated equipment.63 And as drones get safer, more will fly
58. I am using the term surveillance in a broad manner that does not require
observation by a person but encompasses any collecting of data or information that
can be uniquely connected to an individual.
59. See Richard M. Thompson II, Drones in Domestic Surveillance Operations:
Fourth Amendment Implications and Legislative Responses, CONG. RES. CTR. 16
(Apr. 3, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VECZULB].
60. In practice this meant only the government generally had the ability to
occasionally conduct aerial surveillance operations for targeted purposes (i.e., not
mass, persistent aerial surveillance).
61. The Economic Impact of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the
United States, AUVSI 2 (Mar. 2013), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazon
aws.com/AUVSI/958c920a-7f9b-4ad2-9807-f9a4e95d1ef1/UploadedImages/New_
Economic%20Report%202013%20Full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EZU6-KVHP]
(estimating that the drone industry will generate more than eighty-two billion dollars
in economic impact and account for over 100,000 jobs).
62. Id.
63. Boeing has a patent for an autonomous drone that can be recharged through a
tether at a charging station. Benjamin Zhang, Boeing Just Patented a Drone That
Can Fly Forever, BUS. INSIDER (June 5, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/
boeing-patent-mid-air-rechargeable-drones-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/TCC8-FDN3].
Raytheon has a patent that, based on the purpose of the drone, will identify the
important surveillance data for human review. Vlad Shvartsman, Raytheon Patent
Cherry-picks Relevant Data, UAV PATENT BLOG (July 12, 2015), http://www.uav
patents.com/raytheon-patent-cherry-picks-relevant-data/
[https://perma.cc/7K8MGEQN].
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over densely packed urban areas when delivering packages and
providing other services. The omnipresence of drones over urban
areas is ripe for the creation of drone mass surveillance for the
purpose of commercial data collection. This will undermine our
privacy in public in ways that will have a fundamental impact on our
interaction in public space and participation in society.
An abundance of information can be gathered about individuals in
public if drones are allowed to freely collect personal information in
public space. Drones will have a multitude of ways to identify
individuals with the ability to add facial recognition, license plate
readers, MAC address or Wi-Fi tracking, and other capabilities to
identify and track people. Drones, with these capabilities onboard,
will be able to track individuals’ movements in public space and
collect information about where an individual goes on a daily basis
and who an individual interacts with. Information about what church
you attend, what doctors you’ve seen recently, what protests you’ve
participated in, and what stores or other businesses you have entered
could all be collected by various drones flying around the city and
aggregated in one large database.64 Furthermore, all this information
could be subjected to big data analysis by sophisticated algorithms in
The
order to glean additional information from the data.65
surveillance of the public by commercial entities might be a byproduct of drones flying around for other reasons (e.g., delivering
packages) or might be done specifically for financial gain and to
provide law enforcement access to a wealth of data on the people in a
particular city.66 Without any legal protections for privacy in public
this is the reality we face.
III. LACK OF LEGAL PROTECTIONS
Privacy law in the United States is generally a siloed affair. There
is no overarching law or laws that provide general privacy protections
for individuals for potentially sensitive, personal information from
64. In 2016 a private citizen hired Persistent Surveillance Systems to fly a small
plane over Baltimore, Maryland to collect and retain surveillance of the city. The
plane was equipped with a wide-area, real-time surveillance system that covered
around thirty square miles that was described as “Google Earth with TiVo
capability.” Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move From
Above, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016baltimore-secret-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/J68N-2EPF].
65. See Bracken-Roche, supra note 57, at 46 (“Mass data collection afforded
through the persistent data capture capabilities of UAVs can . . . collect a wealth of
‘ambient’ information across a wide range of terrestrial environments, including the
people, objects, and behaviours that are occurring within them.”).
66. See Reel, supra note 64.
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commercial actors. The laws that provide privacy protections are
very specific, in isolated areas, evidenced by the names of the laws.
For example, the Video Privacy Protection Act, Drivers Privacy
Protection Act, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
Right to Financial Privacy Act, and Children’s Online Privacy and
Protection Act.67
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures by government actors.68 These protections
from a government search remain in place even when the government
is trying to perform the search by going through a commercial entity
that has already performed the search if the commercial entity is
acting as an agent of the government.69 For example, if a warrant was
required to perform mass, indiscriminate surveillance with a drone of
a city block, the authorities could not avoid the warrant requirement
by getting the exact same surveillance data from a company like
Persistent Surveillance Systems that actually does perform mass,
indiscriminate aerial surveillance on behalf of law enforcement.70
Currently, police can freely perform surveillance on any scale in
public space without obtaining a warrant, and thus would not need a
warrant to get the same data from a commercial entity. Fourth
Amendment protections largely fall away in the context of
information freely exposed to the public.71
Not only does the Fourth Amendment not protect data exposed to
the public, it does not protect data voluntarily given to a third party.72
If, for example, you signed up with a company to have the drones
flying above constantly track your location in order to send
personalized ads or coupons based on where you happen to be at any
given moment, that location information can be obtained by the
police without a warrant from the company using drones to track your
movement—even if the location data was deemed the type of
information that required a search warrant to obtain. The ability of
law enforcement to obtain information about individuals from
companies that interact with those individuals further undermines
what protections the Fourth Amendment does provide.
67. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel Solove, Information Privacy Statutes and
Regulations
2008-2009
vii-viii,
https://www.informationprivacylaw.com/wp-

content/uploads/2015/10/IPL-Statutes-TOC.pdf [https://perma.cc/57BP-XGBT].
68. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
69. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
70. See Reel, supra note 64.
71. See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion.
72. This is referred to as the third-party doctrine. See infra Parts III-IV for a
discussion of the third-party doctrine.
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A. Fourth Amendment Law, Drones, and Aerial Surveillance
The current state of the law means there is little to no protection
for privacy in public space. Consequently, drones flying in our
National Airspace are free to collect any data that is readily available
from a public vantage point. This is particularly true for private
commercial entities to which the Fourth Amendment does not apply.
Thus individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
against commercial entities in the same way they do against the
government.73 The privacy implications are further heightened by
how the courts have applied the reasonable expectation of privacy to
public space and the third-party doctrine, which will allow law
enforcement to access data collected by commercial drones without a
warrant when the information is collected in public space or the
information is voluntarily handed over.74
Under the Fourth Amendment, people are protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures by a standard known as the
“reasonable expectation of privacy.” The reasonable expectation of
privacy test was first articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
Katz v. United States.75 In Katz, the government had placed an
electronic listening device outside a public phone booth to listen to
the defendant’s phone conversation.76 The government used the
defendant’s side of the conversation as evidence in the case over the
objection of the defendant.77 Katz argued that the phone booth was a
constitutionally protected space under the Fourth Amendment; the
government argued that the phone booth was not constitutionally
protected.78
The Court rejected the parties’ formulation of the issue that
focused on whether the phone booth was a constitutionally protected
area, famously stating “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”79 The Court explained that “[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection.”80 Based on this formulation of
the issue, the Court found that “[t]he Government’s activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361-62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 348.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Id.
Id.
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violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the

telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”81 In other words, Katz had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation in the phone
booth. Having found that a search was conducted, the Court went on
to analyze whether the search was permissible under the Constitution
and found it was not.82 The Court consequently reversed Katz’s
conviction.83
The majority opinion alluded to the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test, but it was in Justice Harlan’s concurrence that the
specific test was expressed. In his concurrence, Justice Harlan
articulated his understanding of the rule used in Katz and prior
decisions, stating “that there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”84
As articulated and applied, the reasonable expectation of privacy
test does not generally extend to information that “a person
knowingly exposes to the public.”85 This reasoning was reflected in
two Supreme Court cases that addressed aerial surveillance.
The Court considered whether aerial surveillance was a violation of
privacy and the Fourth Amendment in California v. Ciraolo86 and
Florida v. Riley.87 In both cases, the Court found that law
enforcement’s observation from public airspace did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.88
In Ciraolo, police, acting on an anonymous tip, flew over the
defendant’s house in a private plane and were able to identify
marijuana growing in the yard.89 Despite the officers viewing a
fenced-in backyard, the Court reasoned that “officer’s observations

81. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 354-59.
83. Id. at 359.
84. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 351.
86. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
87. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
88. Interestingly, both cases indicated that what the officers could see with their
“naked eye” from public airspace was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The “naked eye” line could be used to distinguish aerial observation from a mannedvehicle verse a drone but currently such a challenge has not been made and police
readily use drones without warrants where specific state laws have not restricted
them from doing so.
89. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
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from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which
renders the activities clearly visible” do not violate the Fourth
Amendment.90
Similarly, in Riley the police were acting on an anonymous tip and
flew a helicopter over a mobile home that had greenhouses located
near it.91 The greenhouses generally obscured the contents inside
except for some missing roofing panels.92 Through these missing
panels, the police were able to identify marijuana in the greenhouse.93
The Court in Riley, like in Ciraolo, argued the police “were likewise
free to inspect the yard form the vantage point of an aircraft flying in
the navigable airspace . . . .”94
Thus information exposed to the public, even if only exposed from
aerial vantage points, can freely be collected by law enforcement
drones.95 Even though one may have a subjective expectation of
privacy in public space, particularly in the aggregation of the data
exposed while in public and any information that can be derived from
the analysis of that data, this subjective expectation of privacy is not
one the courts have recognized as accepted by the public.96
B.

The Third Party Doctrine and Drone Surveillance

The lack of privacy in public is exacerbated by the third-party
doctrine, which gives no Fourth Amendment protection to
information freely given to a third party. The origins of the thirdparty doctrine are found within United States v. Miller.97 In that case,
Miller claimed Fourth Amendment protections for his banking
records that were accessed by the government without a judicial
warrant.98 The Court ruled that Miller had no Fourth Amendment
interest in his bank records that were revealed and consequently
conveyed to the government by a third party (i.e. the bank).99 The

90. Id. at 213.
91. Riley, 488 U.S. at 448.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 450.
95. Also, law enforcement can just get the information directly from the drone
companies without the need for a warrant. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying
text.
96. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. But see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-16
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (suggesting that individuals may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their public movements).
97. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
98. Id. at 436.
99. Id. at 445.
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third-party doctrine was largely solidified in Smith v. Maryland.100 In
Smith, the Court ruled that the defendant did not have a Fourth
Amendment interest in the phone numbers he dialed that were
consequently passed to the phone company and collected by the
government, stating “[t]his Court consistently has held that a person
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties.”101
In 2012, the Court in United States v. Jones began to recognize the
problems with the third-party doctrine in a digital age,102 but the cases
that established the doctrine still remain binding precedent. In Jones,
the government installed a global positioning system (“GPS”)
tracking device on a vehicle used by Jones.103 The GPS device was
installed on the vehicle while it was on private property, the day after
the warrant expired, and in Maryland instead of the District of
Columbia, where the warrant authorized installation.104
The
government subsequently tracked the vehicle for twenty-eight days.105
The Court reviewed the lower court’s decision that the warrantless
attachment of the GPS device and the subsequent tracking
constituted a search, and thus violated the Fourth Amendment.106 In
the majority opinion by the Court, written by Justice Scalia, the Court
did not analyze whether a search occurred using the reasonable
expectation of privacy test, instead using the common-law trespassory
test.107 In the concurrence, Justice Sotomayor wrote “[w]hen the
Government physically invades personal property to gather
information, a search occurs.”108 With respect to collecting the same
GPS data without a trespass, Justice Scalia suggested “[i]t may be that
achieving the same result through electronic means, without an
accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but
the present case does not require us to answer that question.”109
Although the majority opinion in Jones did not address whether
GPS tracking for an extended period of time constitutes a search
under the reasonable expectation of privacy test, a majority of
Justices agreed that it did in the concurrences. Both Justice Alito and
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).

Id. at 745.

565 U.S. 400 (2012).

Id. at 403.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 404 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 412.
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Justice Sotomayor wrote concurrences supporting a reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis that found that the GPS tracking
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.110 Justice Alito’s
concurrence was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.111
Those four justices combined with Justice Sotomayor constitute what
has been referred to as a “shadow majority.”112
Both the Alito concurrence and Sotomayor concurrence show
concern for the prospect of creating the same compilation of GPS
data as in Jones, but without any physical intrusion.113 Justice
Sotomayor acknowledged the growing issue of the third-party
doctrine in our digital society, stating:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks.114

Justice Sotomayor’s position that the Court should reconsider the
third-party doctrine is a step in the right direction, if only a partial
one. Unfortunately, information freely exposed to the public that a
drone can collect may need more protection than a new precedent
that overturns the third-party doctrine. In the cases that established
the third-party doctrine, the data in question was only given to a
distinct and definable third party, leaving room to distinguish data
collected strictly from public space since that data is, in some sense,
freely exposed to the public.115 On the other hand, many of the risks
associated with GPS tracking highlighted by Justice Sotomayor in her
concurrence are applicable to mass surveillance by drones of public
space. For example, in Jones, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged the
chilling effect to First Amendment associational and expressive
110. Id. at 413-18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418-19 (Alito, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring).
112. The “shadow majority” references the fact that the reasoning in the
concurrences was not the basis of the majority opinion, but does suggest that the
Court would have had enough judges to consider long-term GPS tracking a search
under the reasonable expectation of privacy test. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Courts grapple
with the mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/04/28/courts-grapple-with-the-mosaic-theory-of-the-fourthamendment [https://perma.cc/Y5P3-AC9V]
113. Jones, 565 U.S. at 413-18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418-19 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
114. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 418.
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freedoms.116 A similar chilling effect occurs with drone surveillance.
Drones typically carry their own GPS devices, and with surveillance
payloads that might include multiple ways to identify an individual,
drones have the capacity to conduct the kind of long term GPS
tracking Justice Sotomayor suggested has a chilling effect on First
Amendment rights.
IV. POTENTIAL MARKET FOR DRONE DATA COLLECTION
The general lack of privacy protections in public space and the
third-party doctrine create the possibility of mass surveillance by the
private sector that will be fully accessible by law enforcement without
the requirement for a judicial warrant. Indeed, businesses may
purposefully collect data for the benefit, in part, of law enforcement
agencies. Drones will fly over populated urban areas with an array of
sophisticated equipment that can and will be used to collect data
about the surrounding environment, including the people in that
environment.
Without some baseline rules or regulations, drones could greatly
increase the commercial industry of selling law enforcement access to
databases of information obtained through the mass surveillance of
public space. This type of market has developed with the technology
of Automated License Plate Readers (“ALPRs”).117 Companies have
taken advantage of the lack of privacy protections in public space to
aggregate massive databases on the public.
Many law enforcement agencies pay for access to data collected by
the private sector. Vigilant Solutions and its subsidiary, Digital
Recognition Network (“DRN”) are two of the many providers of
license plate data to law enforcement.118 Vigilant Solutions only sells
its data to law enforcement officers.119 DRN sells its data to a variety
of third parties, including banks, the auto repossession industry,
college security, and private investigators.120
116. Id. at 416.
117. Steve Orr, License Plate Data is Big Business, USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/02/license-plate-data-is-bigbusiness/18370791/ [https://perma.cc/RAK5-D25Z].
118. Vigilant Solutions, DIG. RECOGNITION NETWORK, http://drndata.com/
company/vigilant-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/2R9J-6T4X]; DIG. RECOGNITION
NETWORK, http://drndata.com/company/ [https://perma.cc/ZX4F-7YJV].
119. See National Vehicle Location Service, VIGILANT SOLUTIONS, http://vigilant
solutions.com/products/nvls [https://perma.cc/4T44-SFR2].
120. Shawn Musgrave, A Vast Hidden Surveillance Network Runs Across
America, Powered by the Repo Industry, BETABOS. (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://www.betaboston.com/news/2014/03/05/a-vast-hidden-surveillance-networkruns-across-america-powered-by-the-repo-industry/ [https://perma.cc/2FAX-RMGB];
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DRN collects data from thousands of private citizens who
volunteer to mount ALPR cameras on their cars.121 When the ALPR
cameras spot a stolen vehicle, DRN pays the private citizen $200$400.122 Vigilant Solutions’ collection of license plate records from
law enforcement also incorporates data from DRN.123 Vigilant
Solutions’ ability to leverage DRN’s commercial collection of license
plate records has created a database of over five billion license plate
hits.124 Other large providers of license plate services include L3
Mobile-Vision and ELSAG.125 ELSAG LPRs are used by over 5000
law enforcement agencies around the world.126
But even if you allow drone companies to collect information that
is not readily exposed to the public, law enforcement may still have
easy access to it without a warrant. This is the case with social media.
Many law enforcement agencies pay for social media monitoring.127
The social media monitoring companies often get direct access to all
the social media from a particular social media site, even to those
users who limit public access to their social media. The social media
monitoring companies provide access to law enforcement to the data
and tools to analyze it all and do so with no warrant from the police
because of the third-party doctrine discussed above.

see also Shawn Musgrave, Massive License Plate Location Database Just Like
Instagram, Digital Recognition Network Insists, BETABOS. (Mar. 5, 2014),

http://www.betaboston.com/news/2014/03/05/massive-license-plate-location-databasejust-like-instagram-digital-recognition-network-insists/ [https://perma.cc/9F43-T2UC].
121. Gil Aegerter, License Plate Data Not Just For Cops: Private Companies Are
Tracking Your Car, NBC NEWS (Jul. 19, 2013, 4:44 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
news/other/license-plate-data-not-just-cops-private-companies-are-trackingf6C10684677 [https://perma.cc/N8PM-CX2F].
122. Elizabeth Kreft, Surveillance For Hire: Would You Take Money to Record
Fellow Drivers?, BLAZE (Mar. 6, 2014, 8:02 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/news/
2014/03/06/surveillance-for-hire-would-you-take-money-to-record-fellow-drivers/
[https://perma.cc/S5EE-6T5N].
123. DIG. RECOGNITION NETWORK, supra note 118.
124. VIGILANT SOLUTIONS, https://www.vigilantsolutions.com/products/licenseplate-recognition-lpr/ [https://perma.cc/96C3-HXY4].
MOBILE-VISION,
http://www.mobile-vision.com/products/alertvu/
125. L3
[https://perma.cc/TVL7-YGE4];
ELSAG, https://www.elsag.com [https://perma.cc/AB2X-FB36].
126. Kim Zetter, Even The FBI Had Privacy Concerns On License Plate Readers,
WIRED (May 15, 2015, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/even-fbi-privacyconcerns-license-plate-readers/ [https://perma.cc/5559-RCP4].
127. Map: Social Media Monitoring by Police Department, Cities, and Counties,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/
analysis/map-social-media-monitoring-police-departments-cities-and-counties
[https://perma.cc/LDF8-3JY2].
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Drones have the potential to make aggregation of commercial
surveillance data of public space big business. Drones are, in one
sense, merely aerial surveillance platforms that can be loaded with an
array of surveillance equipment. There are numerous identifiers that
can be used to track individuals in public, including license plate
readers as well as facial recognition technology and technology that
can collect the MAC addresses that each mobile phone can be
uniquely identified by.128 Without protections for privacy in public,
our physical public space will mirror online surfing where numerous
entities are looking to track information about you as long as you are
in public space.
V. IMPORTANCE OF PRIVACY IN PUBLIC
The concept of “privacy in public” can seem like an oxymoron at
first glance, but the concept is absolutely essential to a wellfunctioning democracy. Privacy in public allows for self-realization;129
it supports freedom of thought130 and associational rights;131 and
privacy in public prevents conformity of thought and the chilling of
speech,132 thus protecting the free market of ideas that is vital for
proper democratic discourse.
Traditional theories of privacy have focused on “securing intimate
and personal realms.”133 The focus was on actual threats to
privacy.134 Not until the rise of information technology and databases
was there a perceived threat to privacy in public.135 Privacy in public
was traditionally protected by economic and technological limitations
that made public information largely obscure.
In an age before information technology, it would have been
extremely hard to collect, analyze, and retain large amounts of public
information over a long period of time for just one person, let alone
millions. Aggregating disparate public records and surveilling the
public activities of one individual would take a great deal of

128. See generally supra notes 1-6.
129. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
26, 37 (1976) (“I shall myself argue that the right to privacy is fundamentally
connected to personhood.”).
130. Id. at 39.
131. Id. at 30.
132. Id. at 43.
133. See Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public:
Challenges of Information Technology, 7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 207 (1997).
134. Id.
135. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 142
(2014).
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resources. The practical obscurity of actions in public meant large
scale surveillance of public space was a minimal concern at best. But
we are increasingly losing this obscurity and drones threaten to
abolish it and make indiscriminate mass surveillance in public space
an everyday occurrence.
Joel Reidenberg has used obscurity as a starting to point to
understand the loss of privacy in public. Reidenberg describes this
loss of practical privacy in three stages: (1) obscurity, (2) accessibility,
and (3) transparency.136
The obscurity stage precedes mass
deployment of information technologies and preserves privacy in
public through the sheer difficulty and cost of traditional
surveillance.137 The accessibility stage implements the technology
that makes personal information accessible to the public.138 Consider
the ubiquity of cameras—from closed-circuit television to cell phones
in everyone’s hands—that can take pictures and record video. The
digitization of public records would be another example.139 The
transparency stage takes all this newly accessible information and
makes it readily available through technologies like search engines,
social media sites, or large databases of license plate data.140
Drones threaten to make our activities in public both more
accessible and more transparent, as all the data from the drones ends
up in large, searchable databases for commercial exploitation.
Drones will not only make public activities accessible and transparent
but if the information drones collect is used to create databases, the
data will be analyzed by sophisticated algorithms that derive
additional information value.141
In the age of domestic drones, obscurity and privacy in public need
to be protected. Privacy in public is vital to our democracy. We must
continue to allow practical obscurity in public space to protect our
privacy. Where we allow our public spaces to become bastions of
mass surveillance we will see a slow degradation of civic engagement

Id.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 148-49.
See, e.g., Anna Forrester, FBI Completes Digitization of Criminal, Civil
Identity Records, EXEC. GOV’T (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.executivegov.com/
136.
137.
138.
139.

2014/08/fbi-completes-digitization-of-criminal-civil-identity-records-penny-harkercomments/ [https://perma.cc/BCR5-7U75].
140. See Reidenberg, supra note 135, at 150.
141. See Bracken-Roche et al., supra note 57, at 46 (“Mass data collection afforded
through the persistent data capture capabilities of UAVs can . . . collect a wealth of
‘ambient’ information across a wide range of terrestrial environments, including the
people, objects, and behaviours that are occurring within them.”).
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in public space.142 As drones are increasingly deployed in our
National Airspace, become more sophisticated, and mass surveillance
of public spaces increases, it will have a detrimental impact on our
democracy.143 It is imperative that drone privacy is addressed now by
the FAA as the agency integrates drones into the National Airspace.
VI. WHY THE FAA SHOULD REGULATE DRONES
Drones pose a unique threat to privacy. The FAA has not only
acknowledged this threat to privacy, but the agency has even
suggested that addressing this threat is necessary to integrating drones
into the National Airspace.144 Yet, the agency has either claimed that
addressing privacy is outside the scope of the agency’s work because
its mission focuses on safety145 or that the FAA Modernization Act
does not require the agency to address privacy.146 Though the agency
has acknowledged the possible relationship between safety and
privacy,147 it fails to recognize the extent to which addressing privacy
is necessary to safely integrate drones.
A. Privacy Must be Addressed to Safely Integrate Drones into the
National Airspace
Without adequate drone privacy rules, self-help methods for
protecting privacy will create the very safety risks the FAA seeks to
avoid. In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for small drones, the
FAA identified two safety concerns. First was the risk of drone
operation without “the ability to see manned aircraft in the air in time
to prevent a mid-air collision between the [drone] and another
aircraft.”148 Second was a “loss of positive control” over the
operability of a drone “due to a failure of the control link between the
aircraft and the operator’s control station.”149 The FAA states that

142. We’ve already seen this online after the Edward Snowden revelations. See
generally PEN AM. CTR., GLOBAL CHILLING: THE IMPACT OF MASS SURVEILLANCE
ON INTERNATIONAL WRITERS 5, 8 (2016), www.pen.org/sites/default/files/global
chilling_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L6E-J6GU].
143. Individual privacy is necessary to maintain a well-functioning democracy. See,
e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912 (2013).
144. See COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 38, at 4.
145. FAA Operation and Certifications of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Final
Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 42,191 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at scattered sections
of 14 C.F.R.).
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed.
Reg. 9544, 9548 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015).
149. Id. at 9549.
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the loss of positive control “could pose a significant risk to persons,
property, or other aircraft.”150
In response to the privacy fears surrounding drone surveillance,
commercial industry has responded with privacy protective measures
for individuals that can lead to loss of positive control and
subsequently pose a significant risk to persons and property. One of
these solutions is known as geo-fencing. Geo-fencing designates a
specific geographic area as restricted air space.151 The drones that are
programmed to respect geo-fenced areas can be forced to avoid these
restricted areas or even forced to land if they enter a restricted area—
removing positive control from the drone operator. Some individuals
opt for a more direct self-help option when encountering drones on or
near their property. The concerns over privacy have resulted in
individuals shooting down drones with guns,152 a self-help method
that has obvious risks, especially in densely populated urban areas.
When individuals and drone manufactures are left with no option
other than to defend their privacy interests, they will create
technologies and react in ways that make operating drones less safe.
The privacy, property, and security interests behind the development
of geo-fencing and the shooting down of drones are just two examples
of why it is unreasonable to separate drone privacy from safety, and
why the FAA must address privacy prior to authorizing widespread
drone deployment.
B.

The FAA Modernization Act Requires the FAA to Address
Privacy Issues

Congress required the FAA to develop a Comprehensive Plan with
specific recommendations for a rulemaking to “define the acceptable
standards of operation and certification” of drones and to “establish
standards and requirements for the operator[s] and pilot[s]” of

150. Id.
151. See What is Geofencing?, AISC, https://www.aisc.aero/what-is-geofencing/
[https://perma.cc/73QT-NDJG].
152. See, e.g., Cyrus Farivar, Kentucky man shoots down drone hovering over his
backyard, ARS TECHNICA (July 29, 2015), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2015/07/kentucky-man-shoots-down-drone-hovering-over-his-backyard/
[https://perma.cc/YCN8-YLKZ]; Cyrus Farivar, Woman Shoots Drone: “It Hovered
for a Second and I Blasted it to Smithereens.,” ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 29, 2016),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/08/65-year-old-woman-takes-out-droneover-her-virginia-property-with-one-shot/ [https://perma.cc/VSG5-5E4X]; Eugene
Volokh, Man arrested for shooting down a neighbor’s drone, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/10/02/man-arrested-for-shooting-down-a-neighbors-drone/
[https://perma.cc/R34A-GC6L].
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drones, as well as to identify “the best methods to ensure safe
operation” of drones in the National Airspace.153
The
recommendations of the Comprehensive Plan were to be
implemented by a notice and comment rulemaking.
In the FAA’s Comprehensive Plan, the agency made clear that
privacy issues need to “be taken into consideration as [drones] are
integrated into the NAS.”154
The agency acknowledged that
“concerns” about how drone operations impact privacy will “grow
The FAA
stronger” as “demand for [drones] increases.”155
specifically identified the work on drone test site rules as a way to
“inform future rulemaking activities and other policy decisions
related to safety, privacy, and economic growth.”156 The agency
proposed that the “lessons learned and best practices established at
the test sites may be applied more generally to protect privacy in
[drone] operations throughout the [National Airspace].”157
Congress was clear in its mandate to the FAA to conduct “a notice
of proposed rulemaking to implement the recommendations of the
[Comprehensive] plan.”158 The FAA identified privacy in the
Comprehensive Plan as one of the issues necessary to address for
drone integration159 and consequently the Act required the FAA to
address privacy in its rulemaking to implement the Comprehensive
Plan.
Indeed, Congress expected the FAA to address privacy. In an
Explanatory Statement that accompanied the 2014 Consolidated
Appropriations Act, Congress required the FAA to conduct a drone
privacy study, stating:
Without adequate safeguards, expanded use of UAS and their
integration into the national airspace raise a host of concerns with
respect to the privacy of individuals. For this reason, the FAA is
directed to conduct a study on the implications of UAS integration
into national airspace on individual privacy.160

The report specifically required the FAA to study “how the FAA
can address the impact of widespread use of UAS on individual

153. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11,
§ 332(a)(2) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
154. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 38, at 4.
155. Id. at 5.
156. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 7.
158. FAA Modernization and Reform Act § 332(b)(2) (2012).
159. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, supra note 38, at 7.
160. 160 Cong. Rec. H1186 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 2014).
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privacy as it prepares to facilitate the integration of UAS into the
national airspace.”161 The report was to be submitted to Congress
within eighteen months of enactment of that appropriations bill and
completed “well in advance of the FAA’s schedule for developing
final regulations on the integration of UAS into the national
airspace.”162 Nearly forty months later the report still has not been
submitted to Congress. The FAA continues to avoid addressing
privacy as Congress required the agency to do.
CONCLUSION
The FAA is the administrative agency with the statutory authority
to issue drone operation licenses and maintain order in the National
Airspace.163
It is the most appropriate agency to oversee
comprehensive privacy rules and regulations for drone operators.
The FAA is uniquely positioned to ensure that transparency,
accountability, and other privacy-protective principles of data
collection are built in to the drone authorization process.
The integration of drones represents a pivotal moment to address
the privacy implications of new technology prior to that technology
saturating society. There are many things the FAA could do to
mitigate the privacy risks posed by drones. Perhaps the most
important thing the agency could do is demand public transparency:
transparency in the surveillance technology and its capabilities that
drones will carry, transparency in any collection, use, retention, or
distribution of sensitive or personal information, and transparency of
any algorithmic analysis of the information that seeks to glean
personal or sensitive information from more innocuous data that has
been collected.
Drones represent a unique threat to our public spaces that has
received much publicity, and if we fail to proactively set baseline
privacy safeguards for drones, we have little chance of addressing the
privacy implications of other technologies that threaten to undermine
our privacy.

161. Id.
162. Id. at H1187.
163. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act §§ 332-334.

